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ROAD TO RECOVERY: PAKISTAN'S HUMAN RIGHTS 
CRISES IN THE FAT A 
Naji'a Tameezt 
"For the first five days they beat us 
constantly with leather belts across the top and 
bottom of our backs throughout the day, up to 
an hour at a time. The pain was too much to 
describe. There were always five soldiers at 
every interrogation session; all in army 
uniform but usually only one of them did the 
talking. He would threaten to kill me if I didn't 
confess to being part of the Taliban. I kept 
telling him that neither I, nor my Ayub, ever 
belonged to the Taliban, we are just farmers. 
On hearing this [he} would scream '[y}our 
brother is going to die tonight! If you don't 
want to see him for the last time speak the 
truth!' "1 
t Naji'a Tameez is a May 2015 graduate of the Syracuse University College of Law. 
She would like to thank her family and close friends for always providing the open 
discussion of this deeply personal topic, which pushed her to conduct her own research into 
the human rights crises in Pakistan's tribal lands. 
1. AMNESTY lNT'L, 'THE HANDS OF CRUELTY' ABUSES BY ARMED FORCES AND TALIBAN 
IN PAKISTAN'S TRIBAL AREAS 20 (2012), available at http://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/ 
files/public/p4026_end_impunity_in_tribal_areas.pdf (last visited May 10, 2015) 
[hereinafter Hands of Cruelty]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Niaz, a 39-year-old farmer from Swat, and his younger brother 
Ayub are among the thousands of men and boys swept up in security 
operations by Pakistan's armed forces in areas formerly controlled by 
the Taliban. Niaz was released ten days after his arrest, on that same 
day he was confronted with Ayub's dead body, the hospital claiming he 
had died of "heart stroke" in army custody. This is just one of the 
thousands of instances of uninvestigated enforced disappearance, torture 
and death inflicted upon the tribal lands of Pakistan. 
The tribal lands have been entrenched in a human rights crisis for 
decades, but since 2004 conditions in the region have taken a 
considerable nosedive. Due to the U.S. led efforts in Afghanistan and 
the Taliban2 insurgency in Pakistan's tribal lands, thousands of people 
in the tribal lands have been subject to unjust and inhumane treatment,3 
tens of thousands of people have died and millions of people have been 
displaced. The Pakistani government has not only made minimal effort 
to remedy this crisis and help its citizens, but has also exacerbated the 
poor conditions in the tribal lands. 
This paper begins by reviewing the structure of government in the 
tribal lands and how said structure puts Pakistan in violation of 
international human rights law, 4 international humanitarian law5 and 
2. The Taliban presence in Pakistan is a combination of Taliban and al-Qaeda militants 
who fled Afghanistan and slipped through Pakistan's borders in 2001 and 2002. They 
formed a new insurgency and drew together Pakistani veterans of the Taliban movement 
and recruited new members who agreed with their platform against U.S. military operations 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Id. at 29-30. All references to the Taliban in this note are 
references to the Pakistani Taliban movement, specifically the TTP. 
3. In Prosecutor v. Furundzija the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia emphasized that humane treatment revolved around "the general principle of 
respect for human dignity[, which] forms the common foundation of both international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law." 
"The essence of the whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well as 
human rights law lies in the protection of the human dignity of every person, 
whatever his or her gender .... This principle is intended to shield human beings 
from outrages upon their personal dignity, whether such outrages are carried out by 
unlawfully attacking the body or by humiliating and debasing the honour, the self-
respect or the mental well-being of a person." 
Daniel Thurer, Dunant's Pyramid: Thoughts on the "Humanitarian Space", 89 lNT'L REV. 
RED CROSS 4 7, 57 (Mar. 2007). 
4. International human rights law is comprised of international human rights treaties, 
which governments "undertake to put into place domestic measures and legislation 
compatible with their treaty obligations and duties." INT'L HUM. RTS. L., available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx (last visited 
May JO, 2015). 
5. International humanitarian law (IHL) is comprised of principles and rules governing 
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customary international law. 6 This paper then argues that Pakistan must 
remedy these grave circumstances in order to meet its international legal 
obligations and abide by its own constitution as it applies to the rest of 
the country. 
Pakistan must ensure that all of its citizenry, of which the people of 
the tribal lands are a part, is treated equally, humanely and in 
accordance with international law and custom. This paper then 
concludes by offering some of the more important reforms Pakistan 
must make to begin complying with international obligations. These 
include, but are not limited to, fully incorporating the tribal lands into 
the central government, setting up proper mechanisms for 
representation, providing adequate education and healthcare, as well as 
equal treatment of women. 
I. THE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES STEM FROM POOR 
GOVERNING STRUCTURE AND PAKISTAN'S INABILITY 
TO BALANCE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INTEREST 
Pakistan is made up of five administrative provinces, 7 one of which 
is in the northwest part of the country, known as the Federally 
Administered Tribal Area ("FAT A"). The FAT A is further divided into 
several tribal agencies, from north to south: Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, 
Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. 8 Most of 
the conduct of all parties to international and non-international armed conflicts. Key 
provisions of IHL include the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (which Pakistan signed in 
1951) and customary international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed 
conflict. What is International Humanitarian Law?, INT'L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (July 
2004), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf (last visited 
May 10, 2015). 
6. "Customary international law refers to international obligations arising from 
established state practice, as opposed to obligations arising from formal written international 
treaties." Customary International Law, LEGAL INFO. INST., available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law (last visited May 10, 2015). 
7. The four remaining provinces are known as Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan and Kyber 
Pakhtunkhwa. Before the renaming of this province in 2010, Kyber Pakhtunkhwa was 
known as the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The former NWFP is also a tribal 
area but it is not the subject of this note. Though there is some spill over from the conflict 
in the FAT A into Kyber Pakhtunkhwa, Kyber Pakhtunkhwa participates in the central 
government and has not been as gravely affected by the US' war in Afghanistan, the Taliban 
insurgency or by Pakistan's neglect. Provinces and Administrative Units of Pakistan, 
GOVT. PAKISTAN, MINISTRY INFO., BROADCASTING, & NAT'L HERITAGE (2012-13), available 
at http://nationalheritage.gov.pk/provinces.html (last visited May 10, 2015). 
8. The FATA is further divided into several tribal agencies, from north to south: 
Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. 
North and South Waziristan are especially troubled within the FAT A because they are 
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these agencies are astride the Durand Line, the disputed international 
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. 9 
The FAT A is a partially autonomous region because, under 
Pakistan's constitution, it is governed primarily through tribal 
leadership but ultimately supervised directly by the executive branch of 
Pakistan's central government. This executive mechanism of governing 
the FATA10 leaves the people living there completely unprotected. 
There is a total absence of law in the region since neither legislative nor 
judicial control officially extends there. The FAT A is Pakistan's least 
integrated and least developed province. 11 The Pakistani state has failed 
to invest in either the human development of this area or in the physical 
infrastructure that would connect the FAT A to the rest of Pakistan. On 
top of that, Pakistanis living in the FAT A have no redress for the gross 
human rights violations that are committed at the hands of tribal heads, 
the Taliban, the Pakistani military, and the United States through drone 
strikes, because there are extensive limitations on the ability of the 
central government to act as a check. As a result, most FAT A residents 
have little sense of patriotism or even responsibility towards the 
Pakistani state. 12 
The influx of Arab Mujahideen in the 1980s and of the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda fighters since 2001 brought "political Islam, money and illicit 
economic activity" to the region and "buttressed emergent Islamist 
leadership."13 The region has also undergone changes in the 
demographic strength of certain tribes; this, in conjunction with the 
infusion of new resources and militant influence, has caused discord in 
the traditional tribal hierarchy. 14 
This has allowed new charismatic, religious leaders to emerge as 
Taliban strongholds, which have led them to become a heavy target of Pakistan's military 
campaign and the primary site of continued drone attacks from the United States. Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas, KHYBER PAKTUNKHWA FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL 
AREAS & BALOCHISTAN MULTI-DONOR TRUST FUND, available at http://www.pakistan 
mdtf.org/fata.html (last visited May 10, 2015). 
9. C. Christine Fair, Nicholas Howenstein, and J. Alexander Their, Troubles on the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan Border, U.S. INST. OF PEACE (Dec. 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.usip.org/publications/troubles-the-pakistan-afghanistan-border (last visited May 
10, 2015) [hereinafter Fair]. 
I 0. See infra Part IV. 
11. Pakistan's Lawless, Impoverished Northwest, ASIA SENTINEL (Aug. 2013), 
available at http://www.asiasentinel.com/society/pakistans-lawless-impoverished-
northwest/ (last visited May 10, 2015) [hereinafter Impoverished Northwest]. 
12. Fair, supra note 9. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
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political entrepreneurs using political Islam as their instrument of 
mobilization. These Islamist leaders also gained considerable 
credibility and resources with the influx of foreign fighters from the 
Soviet-jihad period and the persistent flow of financial and Islamist 
resources during the period of Taliban consolidation in Afghanistan. 
Critically, these new Islamist and militant leaders have robust ties with 
Pakistan's chief Islamist parties (such as the Jamiat-e Ulame- Islam 
and the Jamaat Islami), with the Taliban and its allied militants, as 
well as with al Qaeda. 15 
In addition to these new influences, other factors that contribute to 
the FAT A's instability are the migration of FAT A residents out of the 
FAT A and into the more settled areas of Pakistan or abroad. 16 People 
who leave generally come from "lower tribal lineages with relatively 
low social and tribal prestige" and use the opportunity away from the 
FAT A to financially provide for their families. 17 Leaving the FAT A 
also allows them to understand the inequality in the tribal lands and 
bring this awareness back to those who still live there. 18 In addition, the 
new influx of money allows the families to seek power and influence in 
correspondence with their new wealth, which then begets changes and 
conflict in the tribal structure. 19 
The FAT A gained particular significance because of its location 
along the Afghan border, which resulted in remnants of al-Qaeda and 
Taliban militants seeking refuge in the FATA's remote villages and 
difficult terrain. 20 Militants then used these remote locations to launch 
attacks against international forces in Afghanistan and then also allied 
themselves with local insurgents, based primarily in the Waziristan 
agencies, which then led to concerns regarding Pakistan's internal 
security. Its location makes the FAT A key to policing the Afghan-
Pakistan border and also the primary site of U.S. drone attacks. 21 The 
opposition from the FAT A tribes and their alliances with each other and 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Fair, supra note 9. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. In 2012, the U.S. carried out about 48 serial drone strikes on suspected al-Qaeda 
and Taliban members. These strikes resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties; lack of 
access to these tribal areas has prevented independent verification of statistics. The U.S. 
drone strikes cause much controversy, outrage and civilian casualties in Pakistan. See 
Pakistan: Abuses, Impunity Erode Rights, HUM. RTS. WATC H (Feb. 1 2013), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/0 I /pakistan-abuses-impunity-erode-rights (last visited 
May 10, 2015). 
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with militant groups across Pakistan has made the situation especially 
volatile in the last decade, both for Pakistan's domestic security and the 
war in Afghanistan. 22 The continued drone attacks have also further 
soured the relationship between the FAT A and Pakistan's central 
government, as there is now a feeling of betrayal and abandonment 
where the people of the tribal lands feel their government has allowed a 
foreign power to wreak complete havoc and destruction upon them. 23 
While these factors all contribute to the derogation of the area and to the 
rise of militant violence, the lack of societal development as a result of 
Pakistan's longtime neglect is also a significant factor that must be 
taken into account. 24 
The combination of having to balance domestic interests and the 
interests of foreign powers makes the situation more complicated for 
Pakistan and limits its military options. As a result, many of the actions 
Pakistan has taken in its counter-insurgency effort have been 
questionable. Accusations of arbitrary detentions, torture, enforced 
disappearances and collective punishment have steadily increased over 
the last few years as Pakistan has regained territory from the Taliban 
and shifted its focus to smaller clashes with militant groups. This is 
especially problematic from a legal standpoint because from 2008 to 
2010 Pakistan ratified multiple human rights treaties, including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the UN 
Convention Against Torture ("UNCAT") and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"). 25 
22. SYED FAROOQ HASNAT, GLOBAL SECURITY WATCH - PAKISTAN 144 (2011). 
Though the War in Afghanistan has wound down considerably there are still American 
troops in Afghanistan, training Afghan security forces, aiding in the reconstruction process 
and continuing to manage the presence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. These foreign troops 
are directly affected by Pakistan's ability to manage the FATA and Waziristan especially, a 
fact Pakistan has to take into account when they take action in the region. Id. 
23. Umar Farooq, Civilians Bear Brunt of Pakistan's War in the Northwest, FOREIGN 
PoL'Y (Feb. 11, 2013), available at http://southasia.foreignpolicy.com/ 
posts/2013/02/11 /civilians_ bear_ brunt_ of _pakistans_ war _in _the_ northwest (last visited 
May 10, 2015). 
24. Impoverished Northwest, supra note 11. 
25. Arshad Mahmood, ICCPR Ratified, DAWN (Aug. 2, 2010, 12:00 AM), available at 
http://www.dawn.com/news/875750/iccpr-ratified (last visited May 10, 2015); Chapter IV 
Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, available at 
https://treaties.un.org/pagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREA TY &mtdsg_ no=IV-
9&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 31, 2015); Status of Ratification Interactive 
Dashboard, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS, available at http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited 
May 10, 2015) (Pakistan ratified CEDA W in 1996, the ICESCR in 2008, and the ICCPR 
and UNCAT in 2010). 
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Though compliance with these agreements is difficult to enforce on 
an international level, ratification creates a duty on Pakistan's part to 
fulfill the terms of the treaties. 26 With ratification Pakistan 
acknowledged that there exists a universal standard for the treatment 
and governing of people and that Pakistan has a responsibility to 
provide its citizens with that standard of living. Yet Pakistan has not 
fulfilled its duty of incorporating these universal standards into its 
governmental structure when it comes to the FAT A. 
Despite this, there are ways that Pakistan can begin to repair the 
damage that has been done in the tribal lands and act in accordance with 
its own constitution as well as international law. Pakistan can create a 
fair and more representative system of governing the region by 
integrating the FAT A into the federal union, of which the other 
provinces are already a part. Pakistan can invest in the area's 
infrastructure, education, healthcare system (what little exists), and 
security and hold those who have committed human rights abuses 
accountable. 
IL UNDERSTANDING HOW THE HISTORY OF THE FAT A 
INFLUENCED THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
The history and makeup27 of the FAT A explains the logic behind 
Pakistan's handling of the region, because the fact that the FAT A 
borders Afghanistan makes it a very central and strategic location28 
from which to carry out militant operations. This, in combination with 
the rough and varied terrain, makes the FAT A treacherous for those 
unfamiliar with the terrain to infiltrate. The people of the FAT A, who 
number close to 3.9 million by recent estimates, also make effective 
26. Enforcement of international agreements is difficult because all nations are 
sovereign and there is no overarching legal body that can force states to comply. Often 
economic sanctions or military force are threatened or used to create compliance but such 
actions are dependent upon what stake enforcing states have in another state's compliance. 
Julian Ouellet, Enforcement Mechanisms, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (Sept. 2004), available 
at http: //www.beyondintractability.org/essay/enforcement-mechanisms (last visited May IO, 
2015). 
27. The terrain of the tribal lands makes the region a difficult one to tame. It is a 
mountainous region but is also made up of forests and deserts. Its extreme winters and 
summers make it difficult for armed forces to carry out effective operations. Akbar Ahmed 
& Harrison Akins, Waziristan: 'The Most Dangerous Place in the World, ' AL JAZEERA (Apr. 
12, 2013, 9:37 PM), available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/ 
04/20134983149771365.html (last visited May 10, 2015); HASNAT, supra note 22, at 145 . 
28. HASNAT, supra note 22. 
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military operations difficult. 29 The FAT A operates under a tribal 
system of government where clans are defined by common ancestry; 
most FATA residents are Pashtuns.30 Because most tribes straddle the 
Durand Line, cross border movement is "substantial and difficult to 
control. "31 
Prior to the Taliban insurgency the tribes dealt with issues of 
crime, administration and politics through their own traditions, an 
arrangement that was accepted by the British when they were in power 
and later by Pakistan's government as well. 32 The Jirgas were by no 
means perfect, but they emphasized mediation rather than violence as a 
method of conflict resolution. Safdar Dawar, a journalist from North 
Waziristan and head of the Tribal Union of Journalists, reminisces that 
"the elders and the people recall the situation before 2001, [when] they 
had their own culture, unity, lashkars [militias], and peace committees," 
he explains, that the people of the FAT A know that they were more 
effective than any tools from "these stakeholders in the Great Game."33 
They kept relative peace among the tribal people they served. 34 But in 
recent years, the Taliban gained control and severed the structure of 
29. AMNESTY INT'L, AS IF HELL FELL ON ME: THE HUMAN RIGHTS CRISES IN 
NORTHWEST PAKISTAN 20 (June 2010), available at http: //www.protectingeducation.org/ 
sites/default/files/documents/amnesty_as_if_hell_fell_on_me.pdf (last visited May 10, 
2015) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L]. The tribes of the FAT A have a history of resistance, 
most notably with Soviet occupation forces in 1979 but also much earlier when the British 
were colonizing the Indian sub content. The British tried to establish some sort of central 
rule in Waziristan by sending governors into the region. These governors acted more like 
ambassadors; they had very limited jurisdiction and were barely effective in keeping order 
in the region. Ahmed & Akins, supra note 27. Tribes like the Mehsuds and Wazirs from 
North and South Waziristan regularly repelled the British when the British encroached on 
their territory, they would leave the British forces in shambles and refused to make 
concessions until the colonial troops had no choice but to retreat. David Ignatius, 
Waziristan and the British Experience, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2009), available at 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-10-25/opinions/368562161 south-waziristan-tribal-
areas-tribal-leaders (last visited May 10, 2015). 
30. With a population of at least 50 million, the Pashtun people are Afghanistan's 
largest ethnic group, and are also the second-largest ethnicity in Pakistan. Pashtuns are 
united by the Pashto language, which is a member of the lndo-Iranian language family, 
although many also speak Dari (Persian) or Urdu. Kallie Szczepanski, Who are the 
Pashtun, ABOUT Eouc. (2014), available at asianhistory.about.com/od/gloassaryps/g/Who-
Are-The-Pashtun.htm (last visited May 10, 2015). 
31. Fair, supra note 9. 
32. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 149. 
33. "Stakeholders in the Great Game" is a reference to the key players in the FATA 
conflict, the U.S., the Taliban and Pakistan's military forces. Farooq, supra note 23. 
34. Ahmed & Akins, supra note 27 . 
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Jirgas, giving way instead to militant religious leaders, who govern on 
the basis of stringent religious doctrine. 35 
The Taliban's method of tribal governing is not well taken by the 
people of the FAT A. The people of the FAT A have traditionally abided 
by an honor code called Pashtunwali that predates Islam.36 This ethical 
code, in combination with tradition and religion is what the region's 
culture is comprised of; however, the religious extremism that 
contributed to the region's instability can largely be attributed to the 
relatively recent alterations to the region's power structures. 37 
When Pakistan gained independence from India in 194 7, 
Pakistan's founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah "maintained the British civil 
structure of the tribal agency and the role of the political agent38 in 
administering the Tribal Areas. "39 Jinnah continued to operate the tribal 
lands in much the same way as the British had. However, his leadership 
differed markedly in policy when, in April 1948, Jinnah made the 
unprecedented move of withdrawing military forces from the province 
of Waziristan upon meeting with a grand Jirga of FATA tribesman.40 
He said, 
Keeping in view your loyalty, help, assurances and declarations we 
ordered, as you know, the withdrawal of troops from Waziristan as a 
concrete and definite gesture on our part ... Pakistan has no desire to 
unduly interfere with your internal freedom. On the contrary; Pakistan 
wants to help you and make you, as far as it lies in our power, self-
reliant and self-sufficient and help in your educational, social and 
economic uplift. .. We want to put you on your legs as self-respecting 
citizens who have the opportunities of fully developing and producing 
what is best in you and your land. 41 
As Jinnah is widely considered a brilliant political mind, his speech 
to the grand Jirga can be interpreted as strategic political rhetoric meant 
to placate the tribes. However, it was also a practical assessment of the 
situation and the needs of the region. Jinnah knew that the northwest 
frontier of the newly created Pakistan would be difficult to incorporate; 
its people had a long history of tribal leadership that would not be easy 
35. HASNAT, supra 22, at 149. 
36. Id. 
37. Fair, supra note 9. 
38. See infra Part IV. 
39. Ahmed & Akins, supra note 27. 
40. Id. 
41. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 148. 
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to transition into the central government.42 It is obvious from Jinnah's 
speech that while Pakistan was willing to aid the FAT A it never 
intended to fully integrate the FAT A, which is what created the rift that 
exists today. 
Instead of fighting them into submission with resources and time 
the new government did not have, Jinnah made sure they were aware of 
their internal autonomy, while still being subject to the central 
government. Though keeping the tribal lands autonomous was a 
practical necessity at the time it was ultimately detrimental. Because 
despite their autonomy, the tribal lands are subject to Pakistan's central 
government, yet are inadequately represented in the central government. 
Jinnah had promised the tribesmen economic and social aid to lift their 
society, 
Pakistan will not hesitate to go out of its way to give every possible 
help- financial and otherwise-to build up the economic and social life 
of our tribal brethren across the border. . . It will certainly be my 
constant solicitude and indeed that of my Government to try to help 
you to educate your children and with your co-operation and help we 
may very soon succeed in making a great progress in this direction. 43 
For the next fifty years or so Pakistan struck a balance between the 
tribal structure in the FAT A and Pakistan's central government with 
mechanisms in place to ensure law and order.44 This balance, which 
was just non-interference from the central government, did little to 
actually lift Waziristan or any of the FAT A out of its impoverished 
conditions, in fact the non-interference, and therefore isolation, only 
pushed the FATA further into the Taliban's hands.45 
For example, in 1996, the government extended voting rights for 
adults to the FAT A. 46 But, "mainstream parties were not allowed to 
mobilize in FATA as the elections were supposedly held on a non-party 
basis."47 The problem though is that Islamist parties held great 
influence over mosques and schools, and therefore their candidates 
42. Pakistan had just seceded from India and creating a new country was challenging 
enough without taking on the arduous task of integrating an autonomous tribal region that 
was used to battling those who attempted to conquer it. 
43. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 148. 
44. Ahmed & Akins, supra note 27. 
45. "According to a WHO report, nearly 50 percent of tribesmen live in abject poverty, 
75 percent have no access to clean drinking water. Annual population growth rate is almost 
4 percent as compared to nationally cited figures of 2 percent." Impoverished Northwest, 
supra note 1 1. 
46. Fair, supra note 9. 
47. Id. 
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could effectively lobby for votes. 48 As a result, the tribal lands elected 
mullahs to represent them in the National Assembly in 1997 and again 
in 2002.49 This is a major departure from tradition. Previously, maliks 
chose their tribal representatives to Parliament on a "secular and tribal 
basis. "50 The collapse of the maliki system because of Pakistan's 
neglect and the Taliban's influence, is significant to the FATA because 
it created a power vacuum that mullahs and Islamic militants then 
eagerly filled. 
Pakistan continued to treat the tribal lands as separate and apart but 
never gave them true autonomy as far as governing. Jinnah's political 
promises remained just that; the central government continued to 
neglect the people of the FAT A. 51 The people of the tribal lands have 
always lived in destitute conditions. For shelter, most people live in 
pueblo-like constructions,52 usually with no electricity. The area 
remains impoverished, with extremely low rates of literacy and little to 
no healthcare services. Much of the FAT A is completely inaccessible 
because of the lack of infrastructure, including lack of roads and 
railways. 53 This lack of attention to a major segment of its population is 
a large part of Pakistan's problem in the FATA. 
While the central government has neglected to govern the area and 
has floundered to regain control in the last decade, the Taliban "seem to 
operate with a clear chain of command and high level of discipline, and 
ha[ ve] demonstrated strong-and growing-operational and strategic 
cohesion."54 Residents of the FATA who joined the Taliban have done 
so for a host of reasons, most of which are ultimately traceable to 
unemployment and poverty. 55 Further proving that the rise of Taliban 
influence and religious extremism in the FAT A is directly traceable to 
the lack of social development and infrastructure, a responsibility the 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Fair, supra note 9. 
52. Pueblos were housing constructions built from stone, mud and other local material 
that were built by Native Americans in the Southwestern United States. 
53 . HASNAT, supra note 22, at 147. 
54. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 30. 
55 . Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, Understanding FATA : 2011 Attitudes Towards 
Governance, Religion & Society in Pakistan 's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Vol. V 
2012), COMM. APPRAISAL & MOTIVATION PROG ., available at 
http://www.understandingfata.org/uf-volume-v/Understanding_F AT A_ Vol-V-11.pdf (last 
visited May 10, 2015). 
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central government should be handling. 56 In fact, while more that 30% 
of the FATA characterizes the Taliban as "terrorists," almost 23% 
recognize them to also be uneducated youth. 57 The lack of literacy and 
jobs make supporting the Taliban fruitful for those who join their ranks 
and those who do not join are too intimidated to resist in any 
meaningful way. 58 
III. GOVERNING THE FAT A: CONTRADICTING THE 
CONSTITUTION 
The Pakistani Constitution of 1973 ("the Constitution") gives 
special status to the tribal areas and directs that neither the power of 
Parliament nor of the power of the judicial system shall extend to the 
tribal areas without the President's assent. 59 While the rest of Pakistan 
functions as a parliamentary democratic republic, the FAT A does not. 
Under Article 51 of the Constitution, the FATA is included among the 
territories of Pakistan. 60 The FAT A functions as a combination of 
exclusive executive authority and tribal tradition.61 The extent of the 
FATA's involvement in the central government is that FATA 
representatives can be elected on a non-party basis to the National 
Assembly and the Senate, but it still remains under the direct executive 
control of the President.62 Despite election to the National Assembly 
and Senate, representatives cannot exercise any legislative powers with 
regard to the FATA, meaning that any laws passed by the National 
Assembly do not apply to the FAT A unless ordered by the President. 63 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 95. 
58. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 147. 
59. History of FATA, FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS, available at 
http://fata.gov.pk/Global.php?iid=28&fid=2&pid=23&mid=l3 (last visited May 10, 2015) 
("Soon after [Pakistan's] Independence [from India], the various tribes in the region entered 
into an agreement with the Government of Pakistan, pledging allegiance to the newly 
created state. The agreement ... did not include political autonomy of the tribes. The 
instruments of agreement, signed in 1948, granted the tribal areas a special administrative 
status. Except where strategic considerations dictated, the tribal areas were allowed to 
retain their semi-autonomous status, exercising administrative authority based on tribal 
codes and traditional institutions. This unique system was crystallized in Pakistan's 
Constitution of 1973 ."). 
60. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 51; see also Administrative System, FEDERALLY 
ADMfNISTERED TRIBAL AREAS, available at http://fata.gov.pk/Global.php?iid 
=29&fid=2&pid=23&mid= 13 (last visited May I 0, 2015). 
61. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 149; PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 51, 59, 246-47. 
62. Administrative System, supra note 60; PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 51, 59, 246-47 
63. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 27; Administrative System, supra note 60. 
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The special mechanism for governing this region falls under a 
body of law called the Frontier Crime Regulations ("FCR"). 64 The FCR 
dates back to the 1870s when Pakistan was still part of India and the 
whole subcontinent was under British rule. 65 Despite India's 
independence from Britain, then Pakistan's secession from India, and 
multiple revised constitutions, the FCR has been retained. 66 Through 
reliance on the concept of Collective Punishment, the FCR codifies the 
government's ability to commit human rights violations and fails to 
recognize "the rule of law, due process, political representation or 
democratic institutions."67 Under the FCR, "the government may hold 
an entire tribe or subgroup accountable for the actions of alleged 
wrongdoers. "68 This kind of legal framework and the associated 
mechanisms for law enforcement are specific to the FAT A. Segments 
of FAT A tribes, Pakistani human rights organizations and even 
Pakistan's Supreme Court have decried the FCR; the court going so far 
as to deem the FCR unconstitutional. 69 
Though Pakistan's central government has often promised to 
reform the FCR and improve the status of those living in the tribal 
lands, it has not made any substantial changes to the FCR in 113 
years.70 The millions who live in the FATA still have "second-class 
legal status."71 Pakistan's constitution lays out a list of guaranteed 
fundamental rights for all citizens, but it then excludes the FAT A from 
benefiting from said rights and excludes the majority of judicial, legal 
and parliamentary control from reaching there. 72 
Since the control of parliament and the judiciary do not extend to 
the FAT A, it is essentially under direct executive control. The President 
64. It is worth noting that under art. 247(6) of the 1973 constitution, the president of 
Pakistan has the constitutional authority to end the applicability of the FCR to any agency 
after consulting with a tribal Jirga. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 26-27; PAKJSTAN 
CONST. art. 247, § 6. 
65. History of FATA, supra note 59. 
66. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 247. 
67. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 26; Umar Farooq, Pakistan's FATA: Lawless no 
more?, ALJAZEERA (Mar. 22, 2014, 12:10 AM), available at http://www.aljazeera.com/ 
indepth/features/2014/03/pakistan-fata-lawless-no-more-20 l 4321111550828897 .html (last 
visited May 10, 2015). 
68. Fair, supra note 9. 
69. Id. 
70. Id.; Umar Farooq, Pakistan's FATA: Lawless no more? ALJAZEERA (Mar. 22, 
2014, 12: IO PM), available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/pakistan-
fata-lawless-no-more-20 l 4321111550828897 .html (last visited May 10, 2015). 
71. Fair, supra note 9; Farooq, supra note 70. 
72. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 8(3). 
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appoints a Political Agent 73 ("PA") for each agency within the FAT A 
who exercises a broad range of administrative, executive and judicial 
powers. 74 The PA wields so much power that he can "order whole 
villages to be burnt down and tribes to be blockaded or sent into 
exile. "75 The only check on the PA is that he may consult with the 
Jirgas 76 when resolving disputes. 77 However this is a discretionary 
option left up to the PA. 78 Currently, the FAT A is administered by the 
Governor of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ("KP") "in his capacity as an 
agent to the President of Pakistan, under the overall supervision of the 
Ministry of States and Frontier Regions in Islamabad. "79 
IV. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TALIBAN AND PAKISTANI 
ARMED FORCES 
The current conflict between Pakistan's armed forces and the 
insurgents in the FAT A is widely considered Pakistan's largest security 
threat. Though the social tensions that underlie this conflict are hardly 
new, the war itself began after the U.S. and its coalition invaded 
Afghanistan in 2001.80 The fall of Afghanistan's Taliban regime caused 
many Taliban officers and leaders to cross the border into the FAT A. 81 
As a strategic safe haven, Waziristan was ideal for escaped Taliban 
73. The Political Agent position was created by the British around 1901. "Each 
agency was administered by a Political Agent who was vested with wide powers and 
provided funds to secure the loyalties of influential elements in the area." History of FATA , 
supra note 59. 
74. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 26. 
75. Farooq, supra note 70; see Fair, supra note 9 ("The role of the Political Agency 
has continued to erode both due to the diminished quality and rank of the civil servants 
assigned to the position and due to the ever-expanding corruption within the agency since 
194 7. In recent years, the army has further supplanted the PA' s authority in key agencies 
such as North and South Waziristan."). 
76. Jirgas are traditionally made up of 3 elder tribesmen, known as Maliks , who are 
appointed and dismissed at the whim of the PA. Though they are meant to function as a 
check on the Political Agent's extensive authority, practically speaking, they serve at the 
pleasure of the executive appointed PA. Around the same tie as when the role of the 
Political Agent was carved out, the Maliki system was developed as well. The Maliki 
system allowed the "colonial administration to exercise control over the tribes. Under this 
system, local chiefs (Maliks) were designated as intermediaries between the members of 
individual tribes and the colonial authorities, and also assisted in the implementation of 
government policies." History of FATA, supra note 59. 
77. Farooq, supra note 70. 
78. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 149. 
79. Administrative System, supra note 60. 
80. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 143. 
81. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 20. 
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members to carry out attacks on the U.S-led coalition.82 From there, 
they could assist whatever remained of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, who had by then escaped into the villages and mountains 
to avoid further attack. 83 The northern agencies in the FAT A began 
noticing a significant increase in Taliban presence in 2006. By 2009 a 
substantial portion of the Federally Administered Tribal Area was under 
Taliban control. 84 
Due to this increase in Taliban presence the U.S. government put 
pressure on Pakistan, particularly on then-president General Pervez 
Musharraf, to contain the militant forces that had escaped into the 
FAT A's mountain terrain and then into the rest of the FAT A. 85 
Musharraf was pressured into launching his own military operation to 
assist the U.S. and its allies. This was a difficult decision for Pakistan 
because its military had developed a close working relationship with the 
tribesmen since 1979. 86 Launching a military operation, at the 
insistence of the U.S., against those same tribes was not an easy 
proposition for Pakistan's military to carry out. The fact that the FAT A 
tribesmen, especially those already sympathetic to the Taliban, 
considered the struggle between the U.S and the Taliban as a justified 
"war of liberation" from the U.S.' "War on Islam" made Pakistan's 
decision even more difficult. 87 
Musharraf succumbed to U.S. pressure and beginning in 2002 
Pakistan carried out unenthusiastic military operations, relying on para-
military forces. In 2008 and 2009 Taliban forces blocked supply routes 
through the Khyber agency, which the U.S. and NA TO forces used, and 
proceeded to seize, loot and burn several hundred supply trucks. Due to 
U.S. pressure, Pakistan "conducted fierce battles to maintain this supply 
line" in June 2008, January 2009 and March 2010. 88 Operations like 
these were often botched and then followed with urgent peace 
82. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 143. 
83. Id. 
84. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 20. 
85. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 143. 
86. Waziristan has been kept mostly autonomous because of their tradition of 
militaristic service and support in the defense of Pakistan. Since 1979, Pakistan's military 
established a close relationship with the tribesmen of the FAT A to encourage them to help 
the Afghans in their struggle against Soviet occupation. Waziristan was central to the 
support of the Mujahideen forces attempting to repel the Soviets. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 
143, 145, 147. 
87. Id. at 143. 
88. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 20. 
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agreements with the tribes that later fell apart. 89 It was obvious from 
Pakistan's halfhearted efforts that they had no desire to establish state 
rule in the FAT A by inserting the central government into the largely 
autonomous region, at least not through military means. 
The drawback to this lack luster effort was that it gave legitimacy 
to the Taliban in the FAT A, allowing them to eventually establish their 
own party, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (The Pakistani Taliban 
Movement, also referred to as the "TTP"). Through Pakistan's every 
botched military operation and failed peace agreement, the TTP was 
able to gain sympathy and support from the tribesmen, which led to new 
resources and recruits, eventually creating a serious obstacle for the 
military. 90 The Taliban was no longer just a formidable militant force 
but now also an emboldened and legitimized political influence. 
Through a series of peace agreements, Pakistan released Prisoners 
of War, weapons and territory back to TTP militants, actions that both 
the TTP and the tribes in the FATA saw as a weakness. 91 Encouraged 
by this display of vulnerability the TTP took steps to challenge state 
rule throughout the FAT A by carrying out terrorist activity across the 
country against law enforcement, military facilities and civilian targets 92 
and by appointing their own members to positions of political influence. 
This is where the decline of the maliki system is especially 
problematic. The decline of the tribal governing structure impaired the 
authenticity and legitimacy of the maliks ' leadership.93 Political Agents 
favored maliks whose cooperation they could bribe, creating an 
environment of corruption and mistrust. As a result, the tribes no longer 
recognize or trust maliks as their legitimate representation. 94 They 
instead turned to other political forces, more specifically the 
"charismatic, religious and militant" alternatives offered by the 
Taliban.95 "These new leaders have effectively captured the various 
forms of simmering discontent within the tribes and have emerged as 
more legitimate defenders of tribal interests. Thus, the mullahs have 
now become respected representatives of the tribes, as have key Islamist 
militants in FAT A. "96 
89. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 144. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Fair, supra note 9. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
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The increased influence of the TTP had widespread ramifications 
across Pakistan. Constantly on the defensive in order to preserve the 
interests of the U.S. rather than the interests of Pakistani citizens, 
Pakistan ended up prolonging the conflict. Its indecisive military 
strategy damaged the military's prestige, caused much human casualty, 
property damage and displaced thousands of people, all while causing 
massive strain on Pakistan's economy. 97 Residents of the FATA were 
affected much worse, dying by hundreds due to random and violent 
terrorist attacks, U.S. drone strikes and indiscriminate action by 
Pakistan's military.98 
The U.S. drone attacks and the subsequent bombings by Pakistani 
warplanes further soured the FAT A's relationship and opinion of the 
central government, causing them to seek refuge in the only viable 
opposition, the TTP.99 Anti-U.S. sentiment is still strong in the FATA, 
with 79.3% of tribal people opposing American military presence in the 
area, a number heavily influenced by the continuing drone strikes. 100 
There is also bitterness towards the Taliban for having destroyed the 
peace of the region and bringing upon the FAT A the chaos caused by 
continued drone strikes and Pakistan's military. 101 
Nearly 70% of the FATA opposes the presence of Pakistani 
Taliban fighters 102 because in addition to suicide bombings across 
Pakistan, the TTP has also become an oppressive presence in the FATA 
by constantly eliminating its opponents, fighting the Pakistani state and 
its security forces, and carrying out beheadings and kidnapping people 
for ransom. By 2009, the TTP had carried out so many violent and 
disruptive operations, both outside and within the FAT A, especially 
against military sites that it forced the military' s hand to end the conflict 
97. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 144. 
98. Id. 
99. See Rahimullah Yusufzai, Waziristan - the Mother of all Battles, NEWS (Oct. 20, 
2009), available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=20403 7 &Cat 
=9&dt=9/2/2009 (last visited May 10, 2015). 
100. Shinwari, supra note 55, at 87. 
101. Tribesmen have often banded together to expel al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or other 
extremist groups from their land. But they have also consistently claimed that the source of 
their current problems lies in Afghanistan and the U.S. invasion of 2001. "If you are asking 
about Americans," Dawar says, "100% [of the people] here are hating Americans. They are 
thinking that this whole drama is from the side of America, because they came to 
Afghanistan. That is why they are demanding America leave Afghanistan." Farooq, supra 
note 23. 
102. Shinwari, supra note 55, at 87. 
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as swiftly as possible, leading to more violence and death in the 
FATA. 103 
In 2009, Pakistan renewed air and ground offensives against the 
TTP in the FAT A. These attacks were intended to target militant 
strongholds but were often inaccurate since Pakistan was working with 
very limited and often unreliable intelligence, a result of having little to 
no public support or assets in the area. 104 From the beginning of the war 
in Afghanistan, public opinion in the FAT A favored the Taliban and 
their efforts to rid the region of the infiltration of a foreign power. 
However, the TTP's violent and destructive tactics have caused them to 
lose much of the public sympathy they gained when Pakistan first began 
military operations. 
This does not imply that public opinion has shifted in Pakistan's 
favor. Pakistan's most recent military campaign in the FATA, 
Operation Zarb-e-Azb, an air and ground offensive launched on June 
15, 2014 in North Waziristan, has caused mass civilian casualty and is 
yet another source of major human rights violations exacted by Pakistan 
against FAT A residents. 105 Zarb-e-Azb was launched after government 
peace talks with Taliban leaders once again fell through, and though the 
military had been planning the offensive well before, the Operation was 
pursued ultimately because of the major Taliban attack on Pakistan's 
largest airport on June 9, 2014. 106 
Zarb-e-Azb was aimed to be a "comprehensive operation against 
foreign and local terrorists who are hiding in sanctuaries in North 
Waziristan" but practically resulted in the displacement of 500,000 of 
103. See Yusufzai, supra note 99. 
104. See id. 
105. Rebecca Santana & Asif Shahzad, Pakistan Launches Offensive Against Military 
Near Afghan Border, HUFFINGTON POST (June 15, 2014, 10:23 AM), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/15/pakistan-anny-says-launch _ n _5496487 .html 
(last visited May l 0, 2015). 
106. On June 9, 2014, the TTP claimed responsibility for an attack on Pakistan's 
Jinnah International Airport, located in Karachi. The nearly 12-hour siege left 28 dead, 
including l O TTP attackers. The TTP released a statement following the attack stating, "the 
biggest reason for attacking Karachi airport is because it serves as the biggest air logistics 
center supplying goods for the Crusaders' war in Afghanistan and Pakistan." This statement 
referred to the Afghanistan-bound U.S.-NATO cargo, which comes in through Karachi. The 
siege has also been attributed as the TTP's revenge for the death of Hakimullah Mehsud, a 
prominent Taliban leader who was killed by U.S. drone strike in November 2013. Declan 
Walsh, Pakistani Forces Begin Assault on Militant Strongholds, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 30, 2014) 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01 /world/asia/pakistan-anny-begins-ground-
assault-on-militants.html? _r=2 (last visited May 10, 2015); TTP claims attack on Karachi 
airport, DAWN (Jun. 9, 2014) available at http://www.dawn.com/news/l l l 1397/ttp-claims-
attack-on-karachi-airport (last visited May 10, 2015). 
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people and hundreds of casualties. 107 Zarb-e-Azb has caused Pakistan's 
"biggest conflict-driven humanitarian crises since 2009." 108 The 
Pakistani military has claimed that no civilian casualties resulted from 
Zarb-e-Azb, this claim is unrealistic on its face and has been disproven 
through by refugees from the area who have given accounts of the 
military' s indiscriminate attacks which have resulted in mass civilian 
death and grave injuries. 109 While Pakistan may claim that Operation 
Zarb-e-Azb has been successful in ridding the area of militants and 
dismantling the TTP's power in the FATA, especially in North 
Waziristan, the TTP has made it clear that these claims are inaccurate. 
On December 16, 2014, in what can only be described as 
retaliation for Zarb-e-Azb, seven TTP militants laid siege on a school in 
Peshawar for hours ("Peshawar Attaack"). 110 The school, Army Public 
School and Degree College, is primarily for the children of active 
military members. 111 By the time the siege ended later that day, there 
were at least 100 injuries and 152 casualties; 132 children, 10 school 
staff members, three soldiers and the seven militants. 112 The attack is 
considered the deadliest attack in Pakistan since October 2007. 113 
Pakistan, in a very opportunistic fashion, has used the Peshawar 
Attack to institute fast track avenues around the criminal justice system. 
On December 17, 2014, the day after the Peshawar Attack, the Prime 
Minister, Nawaz Sharif, lifted a moratorium on the death penalty, which 
has been in place since 2008, and promised that death warrants would 
follow in the coming days. 114 Given that the rise of Taliban control in 
the FAT A and the main source of criticism against the Pakistani 
government in the FAT A is based on the lack of fair governing - the 
renewal of the death penalty is particularly problematic. 
107. Syed Azeem & Noaman G. Ali , Zarb-e-Azb and the Left: On Imperialism's 
Materiality, T ANQEED (Aug. 2014) available at http://www.tanqeed.org/2014/08/zarb-e-azb-
and-the-left-on-imperialisms-materiality/ (last visited May 10, 2015); Santana & Shahzad, 
supra note 105. 
108. Walsh, supra note 106. 
109. Id.; Santana & Shahzad, supra note 105 . 
110. Sophia Saifi & Greg Botelho, In Pakistan School Attack, Taliban Terrorists Kill 
I45, Mostly Children , CNN (Dec. 17, 2014), available at http: //www.cnn.com/ 
2014/12/16/world/asia/pakistan-peshawar-school-attack/ (last visited May 10, 2015). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Sheree Sardar & Katharine Houreld, Pakistan PM Lifts Moratorium on Death 
Penalty After School Attack, R EUTERS (Dec. 17, 2014), available at http: //in.reuters.com/ 
article/2014/12/17/pakistan-school-deathpenaltyidINKBNOJVOLJ20141217 (last visited 
May 10, 2015). 
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Currently, more than 8,000 prisoners sit on Pakistan's death row, 
and about 10% of them are convicted of "terrorism" related offenses. 115 
Pakistan's definition of terrorism is very broad, to the point where 
almost any crime can fall under the category of "terrorism," as a result 
more that 17,000 cases of terrorism are pending in special courts. 116 
Those convicted of terrorism are often denied their basic rights; they are 
tortured into confessions, denied lawyers, and denied adequate living 
conditions. 117 Many defendants who have been convicted of terrorism 
were charged on the basis of crimes that bore no relation to terrorism in 
the first place; they were sentenced to death despite incredibly unfair 
trials. 118 
What makes this situation even worse, especially for those in the 
FAT A who suffer most from these government injustices, is that this 
heavy crackdown on "terrorism" has not stopped militant attacks. 119 
These crackdowns, which essentially pervert the criminal justice 
system, have done nothing to alleviate the actual problem of Taliban 
militancy. Instead, they are just another way in which Pakistan's central 
government commits human rights violation through the justification of 
maintaining security in the FAT A and in Pakistan as a whole. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. Under Section 6 of the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act (AT A), "Terrorism" is 
defined as "the use or threat of action" where among other things, "the use or threat is 
designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the government or the public or a section of 
the public or community or sect or create a sense of fear or insecurity in society; or the use 
or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a religious, sectarian or ethnic cause." The 
Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 1997, FED. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, GOVT. OF PAK.JSTAN, 
available at http://www.fia.gov.pk/ata.htm (last visited May IO, 2015). In 2013, the ATA 
was amended so as to expand Section 6 - adding in that "intimidating and terrorizing the 
public, social sectors, media persons, business community or attacking the civilians, 
including damaging property by ransacking, looting, arson or by any other means, 
government officials, installations, security forces or law enforcement agencies" would also 
be considered "terrorism." Amendment of Section 6, Act XXVII of 1997, GAZETTE OF 
PAK.JSTAN EXTRAORDINARY, Mar. 26, 2013, at 2, available at http://www.na.gov.pk/ 
uploads/documents/1365050846_309.pdf (last visited May 10, 2015). This means that 
almost any criminal action can be categorized as terrorism. Such language lends itself to 
abuse, hence the large amount of terrorism related cases pending in Pakistani courts and the 
hundreds of people sitting on death row. 
117. Sardar & Houreld, supra note 114. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
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V. PAKISTANI ARMED FORCES AND CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT COMMIT INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS UNDER THE GUISE OF 
MAINTAINING SECURITY 
The human rights crisis in the FAT A can be attributed to three 
main sources, the neglect and mistreatment from the Pakistani 
government and military, Taliban militancy and influence and the U.S.' 
drone attacks. Actors are largely able to continue committing human 
rights violations because the very setup of the FAT A leaves the area 
susceptible to corruption and abuse. Although the FAT A accounts for 
7% of the national population, it receives a mere 1 % of the national 
budget. 120 The estimated unemployment rate reliably rests somewhere 
between 60% and 80% but it often reaches higher numbers depending 
on patterns of migrant labor. 121 In regards to healthcare, the ratio of 
doctors to people in the FATA is about 1 to 7670, whereas the national 
average is about 1 to 1226. 122 There is about one hospital for every fifty 
square kilometers, which serve large populations, sometimes extending 
to those living Afghanistan's side of the border. 123 The FCR is 
responsible for this neglect because the various branches of government 
are barely accountable to the FAT A. 
Relying on the FCR to govern the FAT A violates Pakistan's 
human rights obligations under the international human rights 
conventions. 124 The extension of the FCR's power is in direct conflict 
with the Constitution and the rights it guarantees to the rest of 
Pakistan's provinces. The FCR denies FAT A's residents equal 
protection under the law, as well as voting rights. 125 Pakistan's central 
government and military forces often exploit the FCR to justify human 
rights violations, such as collective punishment and unwarranted 
detention of tribal leaders' relatives, in an effort to pressure those 
leaders for State purposes. 
Since the jurisdiction of Pakistan's judiciary does not extend to the 
FAT A, the FCR has its own judicial mechanism, which consequently 
has negative human rights implications. Under the FCR, a Jirga 
120. See Impoverished Northwest, supra note 11. 
121. See id. 
122. See id. 
123. See id. 
124. See infra discussion Section VI, Pakistan is Obligated to Act in Compliance with 
the International Human Rights Obligations it is a Party to. 
125. See PAKJSTAN CONST., arts. 8-28. 
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decides all civil and criminal matters arising in the FAT A. 126 Should a 
FAT A resident wish to appeal a Jirga 's decision they may do so to the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan (Pakistan's highest court) or to the Peshawar 
High Court through a constitutional writ challenging the decision. 127 
The FAT A is divided into two administrative categories, protected 
areas, which are under the direct control of the government and non-
protected areas, which are administered (indirectly) through local 
tribes. 128 
In protected areas, criminal and civil cases are decided by political 
officers vested with judicial powers. After completing the necessary 
inquiries and investigations, a Jirga is constituted with the consent of 
the disputing parties. The case is then referred to the Jirga who issues 
a verdict, which is examined by the Political Agent. This decision can 
be appealed against to the High Court and Supreme Court. Once 
appeals are exhausted, execution of the verdict is the responsibility of 
the political administration. In non-protected areas, cases are resolved 
through a local Jirga at the agency level. Local mediators first 
intervene to achieve a truce (tiga) between parties in a criminal case, 
or to obtain security (muchalga) in cash or kind for civil disputes. 
Thereafter, parties must arrive at a consensus concerning the mode of 
settlement (arbitration), riwaj (customary law) or Shariah (Islamic 
law). Once the mode of settlement is agreed upon, mediators arrange 
for the selection of a Jirga, with the consent of the parties to the 
case. 129 
Under customary international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law and Pakistan's own Constitution, the right to a fair 
trial and an impartial court is necessary, but Pakistan has not extended 
that principle to the FATA. 130 As it stands, the PA, or a Jirga appointed 
by the PA, carries out judicial functions. However, neither can be 
considered impartial judicial bodies, and under the FCR their decisions 
may not always be appealable to Pakistan's higher courts. 
This has always been problematic but is more so now because 
under the FCR the power of the PA is so extensive that on "vaguely 
defined grounds he can order that individuals or entire communities be 
detained without trial for years at a time seize their property and impose 
fines, all without any requirement of ordinary criminal trial." 131 This 
126. Administrative System, supra note 60. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. AMNESTY lNT'L, supra note 29, at 27; PAKISTAN CONST. art. 10. 
131. AMNESTY INT' L, supra note 29, at 27. 
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provision has often been used to justify collective punishment during 
recent military operations in the FAT A. One of the more notable 
instances was during the large-scale military operations in Waziristan in 
October 2009. The military blocked tribal access to necessary 
humanitarian aid when they suspected members of the Mehsud tribe to 
be involved in Taliban activities, punishing an entire population of 
people for the suspected actions of a few. 
In recent years, with the increased presence of the Taliban, 
Pakistan's military operations in the region, and the U.S. drone attacks, 
the tribal mechanism of policing and redress fell subject to the Taliban. 
The Taliban openly killed Maliks and entire Jirgas for their alleged 
cooperation with Pakistan's central government and military. They then 
replaced this already corrupt system with insurgents or Mullahs who are 
more sympathetic to the Taliban. 132 
Before the Taliban insurgency, tribes in the FAT A had largely 
policed themselves through their own traditions, mainly the Jirgas. 
This method of enforcement was unfair to begin with because the Jirgas 
and Maliks were appointed on the basis of how useful they could be to 
the PA. 133 As structured under the FCR, the Jirgas also discriminated 
against women by denying women access to tribal councils, even when 
many of the decisions directly impacted them. This is just another way 
the FCR contradicts the broader constitution, which guarantees, "all 
citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law" 
and that "there shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone." 134 
In the last few years, Pakistan has managed to regain control over 
most of the FAT A from the Taliban. But in order to accomplish this 
goal the military has detained thousands of suspected Taliban supporters 
without giving any cause for such action. 135 In an effort to combat 
Taliban insurgents Pakistan passed legislation to give the military a 
wider breadth of discretion. The Actions in Aid of Civil Power 
Regulations (AACPR) was passed in 2011. 136 While the FCR allows 
expansion of executive power into the FAT A and limits the reach of 
parliament and the judiciary, the purpose of the AA CPR is to enable the 
military to operate against the Taliban and other "armed groups" in the 
132. Id. at 28-29. 
133. Id. at 28. 
134. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 25, §§ 1, 2. 
135. Hands of Cruelty, supra note 1, at 12. 
136. Report Exposes 'the Hands of Cruelty ' in Pakistan's Tribal Areas, AMN ESTY 
INT' L (Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/report-exposes-hands-
cruelty-pakistan-s-tribal-areas-2012-12-12 (last visited May 10, 2015). 
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Tribal areas "in accordance with the law." 137 The AACPR also gives 
the armed forces the flexibility to take on "law and order duties" and 
"law enforcement operations."138 
In combination with the FCR, the AACPR gives the military 
enough legal coverage to arrest and detain suspects without 
justification. What is more troubling is that the military's arrest and 
detention practices go way beyond the enhanced powers granted to 
them under the AACPR, human rights violations committed by the 
military extend as far as enforced disappearances, torture and other ill 
treatment of prisoners, which sometimes lead to death. 139 Amnesty 
International reports that on a weekly basis "[ m Jen and boys allegedly 
arrested and detained by the Armed Forces are being returned dead to 
their families or reportedly found dumped across the Tribal Areas." 140 
Though the families of the detained and the dead often seek 
redress, they are given no explanations for why their loved ones were 
taken or what happened to them in the months and years they were 
gone. The military conducts no investigations into why the detainees 
were arrested in the first place, what happened to them while they were 
in prison or what led to their deaths. 141 Regional high courts have called 
for local authorities to look into the dumped bodies and a host of other 
illegal activities, but investigations are rarely carried out and the 
military has not been called upon to give any sort of accounting. 142 This 
type of treatment and lack of accountability further degrades the image 
and reputation of the government and the military in the eyes of those 
living in the FAT A. The only way for Pakistan to rectify these 
extensive human rights violations and its reputation is to make 
significant policy reforms and effective mechanisms of redress. 
One would think that the government and military are not held 
accountable because their violations are hard to prove or because 
records do not exist. However, there are reports that document the 
military' s activities regarding forced detention, disappearances and 
torture as a method of combating the Taliban in the FAT A. The 
military has admitted to some of these reports, acknowledging the 
detention of some 700 militants held without charges or possibility of 
137. Hands of Cruelty, supra note l, at 8-9. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 13. 
140. Id. 
141. /d.atl7 
142. Hands of Cruelty, supra note l, at 17. 
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trial. 143 Upon inquiry, Pakistan's Attorney General, Irfan Qadir, told the 
Supreme Court, "There is a military operation in Waziristan. Under the 
law we cannot try these 700 people, nor can we release them, unless the 
operation is over."144 
A case that has become famous throughout Pakistan is the case of 
the Adiala 11. Eleven prisoners were arrested from different places 
because they were believed to be connected to terrorist activity, 145 but in 
April 2010, they were all acquitted of the charges by an anti-terrorism 
court. 146 Despite their acquittal the eleven prisoners remained in a 
detention facility for about a month. Finally, in May 2010, a regional 
high court called for the release of the prisoners, declaring their 
detention illegal, but shortly after that the eleven had disappeared from 
the prison. 147 Pakistan's intelligence agencies continued to give 
contradictory statements for sometime before finally admitting to 
having them in custody, by which time four had died. 148 
VI. PAKISTAN IS OBLIGATED TO ACT IN COMPLIANCE WITH 
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
IT IS A PARTY TO 
Obligations to citizens within a country's borders do not arise from 
just domestic legislation. Countries are bound by an international legal 
system as well. International human rights law, international 
humanitarian law and customary international law all play a role in 
making sure that all people are given equal opportunities and are treated 
143. Pakistan Admits to Holding 700 Militants Without Charge, REUTERS (Jan. 24, 
2013, 7:02 AM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01 /24/us-pakistan-
detainees-idUSBRE90NOHD20130124 (last visited May 10, 2015). 
144. Id. 
145. Waseem Ahmad Shah, Case of 'Missing' Adiala Prisoners Far From Over, 
DAWN (Aug. 13, 1012, 2:45 AM), available at http://dawn.com/news/741861/case-of-
missing-adiala-prisoners-far-from-over (last visited May 10, 2015). "The prisoners are 
wanted by intelligence agencies in connection with different acts of terrorism, including an 
attack on the GHQ, a rocket attack on the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra, bomb 
blasts at the Rawalpindi Parade Lane mosque, shots fired from anti-aircraft guns on a plane 
carrying former President Pervez Musharraf, suicide attacks on a bus of an intelligence 
agency in Rawalpindi and other attacks on different military installations and killing of a 
number of senior army personnel." Bring 'Missing' Detainees to Court, Agencies Ordered, 
DAWN (Feb. 11, 2012, 5:35 AM), available at http://dawn.com/news/694709/bring-missing-
detainees-to-court-agencies-ordered (last visited May 10, 2015). 
146. Shah, supra note 145. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
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humanely. The human rights obligations most relevant to the conflict in 
the FAT A ( which are covered by an array of international laws) are the 
rights to life, fair trial, water, food, housing, education and the highest 
attainable standards of healthcare. There are also significant 
prohibitions on torture, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and 
discrimination against women. Pakistan is a party to many international 
agreements that cover this broad range of human rights issues and 
ratifying149 or acceding150 these agreements were notable steps towards 
human rights and an acknowledgment of responsibility towards its 
citizenry of a certain standard of living and treatment. Though, it is 
certainly not enough unless Pakistan takes serious steps towards 
compliance with these agreements through governmental reform. 
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") and the UN Human 
Rights Committee have confirmed that international human rights law 
applies both in peacetime and during times of armed conflict. 151 While 
some of these rights can be modified or limited during times of armed 
conflict, this can only be done as absolutely necessary depending upon 
the circumstances of the situation. 152 Therefore the current conflict in 
the FAT A does not give the Pakistani government or military legal 
justification under international law for the abuses it carries out. 
A. International Obligation to Children 
In 1990 Pakistan ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
("CRC"). 153 The CRC requires that states make every available effort to 
ensure children have access to the highest attainable standards of 
healthcare, compulsory primary education with an effort to develop 
adequate general and vocational secondary education and access to 
adequate food, water and housing. 154 The CRC also prohibits torture, 
149. Ratification is the act where a state indicates its consent to be bound to a treaty. 
Glossary of Terms Relating to Treaty Actions, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
available at https://treaties.un.org/pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/ 
page l _ en.xml#ratification (last visited May 10, 2015). 
150. "Accession" is the act where a state accepts the offer or the opportunity to 
become a party to a treaty already negotiated and signed by other states. It has the same 
legal effect as ratification. Accession usually occurs after the treaty has entered into force. 
Glossary, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, available at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ 
Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/page l _ en.xml#accession (last visited May 10, 
2015). 
151. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 93. 
152. Id. 
153. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. 
NRes/44/25 (Sept. 2, 1990). 
154. Id. arts. 3, 24, 27, & 28 . 
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cruelty, lengthy imprisonment and capital punishment against children 
and seeks to ensure that no child is deprived of life or liberty 
"unlawfully or arbitrarily."155 Further specifying that all "arrest, 
detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law 
and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest 
appropriate period of time." 156 
B. International Obligation for the Equal Treatment of Women 
In March 1996, Pakistan acceded to the International Convention 
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women 
("CEDA W"), a major treaty advocating the equal treatment of 
women. 157 In addition to contradicting the constitution, the FCR' s 
treatment of women also violates the CEDA W, which requires Pakistan 
"accord to women equality with men before the law." 158 CEDAW goes 
so far as to require states parties take the appropriate measures 
[T]o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and 
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and 
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the 
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped 
roles for men and women. 1 59
Under CEDAW Pakistan is obligated to rectify the unequal 
treatment women in the tribal areas face as a result of tribal culture, the 
Jirgas and the Taliban. 
For women in general, CEDAW requires state parties to give 
women, in equality with men, the right to vote and to be elected in all 
publicly elected bodies and also to participate in the formulation of 
govemment. 16° CEDAW also has specific provisions when dealing with 
the plight of rural women that can be applied to the FATA. 161 It 
requires states parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure rural 
women the right to participate in development planning, to have access 
to healthcare (including family planning), to be able to attain formal and 
155. Id. art. 37, para. b. 
156. Id. 
157. Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
1249 U.N.T.S. 13, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter 
CEDAW]. 
158. Id. art. 15(1). 
159. Id. art. 5(a). 
160. Id. art. 7. 
161. Id. art. 14. 
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informal education, to participate in their communities and to have 
adequate housing, electricity, water and transportation. 162 
C. International Obligation to Provide Humane Living Conditions 
On April 1 7, 2008 Pakistan ratified the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"). 163 The ICESCR 
requires state parties to recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living, which includes adequate food, clothing and housing, 
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. 164 The 
ICESCR also requires that the "development of a system of schools at 
all levels shall be actively pursued" and that all people have access to 
the highest attainable standards of physical and mental health. 165 The 
ICESCR also deals with the equal treatment of all individuals regardless 
of race, color, sex or other affiliation and with labor rights. 166 
On June 23, 2010 Pakistan ratified the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the UN Convention against 
Torture ("UNCAT"), two of the most notable international agreements 
dealing with equality and human rights. 167 Many of the rights and 
prohibitions expressed in these two treaties are also represented in the 
ICESCR, CEDA W and the CRC, as well as a host of other international 
agreements and customary international law. The ICCPR and UNCAT, 
as two of the more influential human rights agreements, further 
reinforce Pakistan's awareness of the standards it should be applying to 
all of its citizenry. They also further cement Pakistan's international 
legal obligation to abide by human rights guidelines and reform the 
structure of the FAT A to meet them. 
The ICCPR deals with individuals' civil and political rights, 
addressing the issues of freedom of speech, religion, assembly, voting 
rights and due process concerns. 168 Specifically the ICCPR provides for 
those whose rights have been violated to be able to seek effective 
remedy and that those who claim such remedy "have [their] right[ s] 
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative 
162. CEDAW, supra note 141, art. 14. 
163. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Apr. 17, 2008, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
164. Id. art. 11. 
165. Id. arts. 12-13. 
166. Id. arts. 2, 8. 
167. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, June 23, 2010, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
168. See id. 
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authorities . . . and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy" 
where they do not already exist. 169 The UN CAT seeks to prevent the 
state use of torture and cruel and inhuman treatment and punishment. 
The UNCAT defines torture as 
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, 
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity. 170 
By June 2011, Pakistan had withdrawn most of its reservations to the 
ICCPR and the UNCAT. 171 
In the last few years, since Pakistan has shifted its focus from 
large-scale military operations to search and intelligence gathering 
initiatives, the military has arrested and detained thousands of people. 
Human rights groups have expressed concern over the treatment of 
these detainees since reports of mistreatment and torture have come to 
light. 172 Torture and cruel and inhumane treatment are prohibited by 
multiple international agreements, including the ICCPR, the Geneva 
Conventions, customary international law, and the UNCAT. 173 
169. /d.art.2. 
170. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishent, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 1., U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984). 
171. Pakistan Decides to Withdraw Most of Reservations on ICCPR, UNCA T, NATION 
(June 23, 2011), available at http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-
english-online/national/23-Jun-2011/Pakistan-decides-to-withdraw-most-of-reservations-on-
ICCPR-UNCAT (last visited May 10, 2015). With respect to the ICCPR, Pakistan still has 
reservations regarding Article 3 and Article 25, which deal with gender equality and voting 
rights respectively, making these articles subject to the provisions in Pakistan's constitution. 
ICCPR, supra note 167 (Pakistan should withdraw its remaining reservations so that the 
ICCPR and UNCAT are more effective). 
172. Amnesty International has documented the situation of detainees who are kept 
malnourished and received daily beatings, causing them to suffer major bodily injury and 
disfigurement. The military has also been accused of resorting to torture in the detention 
facilities as a method of interrogation. Hands of Cruelty, supra note 1, at 19. 
173. Torture is a crime under international law and information obtained through 
torture or inhumane treatment should not be admitted as evidence in judicial proceedings. 
Id. at 21; JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME 1: RULES (Cambridge University Press, 
2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-intemational-
humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf (last visited May 10, 2015). 
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For example, article 6 of the ICCPR provides that "[e]very human 
being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law 
and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life," yet Pakistan 
continues to detain individuals without cause, detention that often 
eventually leads to their uninvestigated deaths. 174 Article 7 of the 
ICCPR provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," a general assertion that 
is supported more extensively by the UNCAT. 175 Pakistan has agreed to 
these provisions and almost all others in these treaties yet continues to 
allow its military to exact cruel treatment justified through its own laws, 
such as the AACPR. 
In part, these human rights violations continue because there is 
neither any real consequence levied against the state nor any 
opportunity for FATA residents to seek redress. Pakistan's constitution 
explicitly excludes the tribal lands from judicial jurisdiction, leaving no 
way for the courts to rule on issues of fundamental rights and impunity 
within the FAT A. Legislation like the AA CPR makes redress for 
human rights violations especially difficult because it leaves much 
military action discretionary and therefore above reproach. 176 This sets 
up a series of legal and practical barriers that prevent the people of the 
tribal lands from bringing suit against the military in Pakistan's courts. 
Despite these obstacles, some cases had made it through, and the 
military has even conceded to unlawful action. 177 
While these concessions are an important step in developing a 
judicial mechanism of redress, they have not translated into justice for 
the victims, consequences for the perpetrators or legislative reform. 178 
Failing to take steps toward reform or at least investigating these 
occurrences of human rights violations puts Pakistan in violation of its 
international human rights agreements and its international legal 
obligations. Specifically Article 2 Section 3 of the ICCPR each state 
that is a party to the agreement has the responsibility to ensure effective 
remedies for those whose rights and freedoms are considered violates. 179 
The violation of rights and the determination of remedy is to be made 
174. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 6 § 1. 
175. Id. art. 7. 
176. Hands of Cruelty, supra note 1, at 9. 
177. Cyril Almeida, The Adiala 11, DAWN (Feb. 19, 2012), available at 
http://dawn.com/news/6966 l 5/ (last visited May 10, 2015). 
178. Hands of Cruelty, supra note 1, at 9. 
179. I CCPR, supra note 167, art. 2 § 3. 
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by "competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities" which 
"shall enforce such remedies when granted." 180 
In addition to violations of international human rights law, 
Pakistan is also in violation of international humanitarian law. 
Pakistan's conflict in the FATA is a non-international armed conflict, 
and as such, Pakistan is obligated to at least abide by Article 3 of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions. 181 Article 3 provides that prohibited conduct 
applies to any person not actively involved in hostilities for any 
reason. 182 On November 11, 2009, UN Security Council Resolution 
1894 dealt with the protection of civilians in armed conflict and it 
emphasized that "states bear the primary responsibility to respect and 
ensure the human rights of their citizens, as well as all individuals 
within their territory as provided for by relevant international law."183 
Therefore, it is important to note that while Taliban insurgents are not 
adhering to the rules of international law, that does not give Pakistan 
valid reason to also violate international law nor does it deprive in any 
way the civilian population from the protections of international law to 
which they are entitled to from their government and the international 
legal framework. 184 
VIL PAKISTAN CAN REMEDY HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY 
GOVERNING THE FATA IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
Human rights organizations like Amnesty International have been 
calling on Pakistan to reform or repeal the FCR for years and this is 
certainly important. However, another important step towards reform is 
earning the people's trust, establishing a consistent message and 
following through on it. So far the only thing Pakistan has been 
consistent about in the FAT A is its neglect of it. When Pakistan has 
peace talks with the Taliban, 185 begins reconstruction efforts or 
180. Id. 
181 . AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at l 01. 
182. Id. 
183. S.C. Res. 1894, U.N. Doc S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009). 
184. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 101. 
185. The Pakistani Taliban leadership has demonstrated its ability to negotiate, 
conclude, and implement agreements. The decisions of the Pakistani Taliban leadership, for 
example when declaring ceasefires, are implemented and enforced by local fighters. A 
central hierarchy seems to command and control the escalation and the de-escalation of 
military tactics, including serious violations of IHL, such as the use of suicide bombings to 
target civilians, attacks on local tribal leaders, and restrictions on the operation of 
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implements new government initiatives it needs to make its 
commitments clear, it must lay out effective and specific plans with 
realistic targets that alleviate the human rights abuses and move the 
population forward. This means Pakistan needs a clear strategy for 
integrating the FAT A and for the creation of necessary infrastructure 
like roads, an education system and adequate health care. Pakistan 
should incorporate civilian needs into its military strategy by offering 
access and protection to civilian necessities like health care and 
education, especially the education of women and girls, which the 
Taliban severely limited. 
Pakistan must also take care of its weighty Taliban problem. This 
is obviously a difficult feat because after decades of insurgency, the 
Taliban have proved to be a challenging and well-structured enemy. 
The Taliban have been reduced in numbers, and while they are certainly 
still an active threat, they are no longer as large a presence in terms of 
militant force. Because the Taliban still have an influential presence in 
the FAT A through maintenance of control of the local governments, the 
people of the region, even when they disagree, cannot voice their 
dissent for fear of lethal retribution. 186 
In order to remedy the egregious human rights situation Pakistan 
and the Taliban have created in the FAT A Pakistan must first, enact 
legislative reform by integrating the FAT A into the parliamentary 
system and extending to the FAT A the same rights and amenities 
afforded to the rest of the country. Second, Pakistan must implement 
these reforms by creating mechanisms for adequate representation, 
healthcare, education and equal rights for women. It is important for 
Pakistan to realize that any remedy in the region cannot be achieved 
through a completely top-down approach. The central government 
cannot simply mandate or legislate its way to reform. In a region very 
much used to a high level of independence, grass roots initiatives and 
local involvement are not just a good idea, but they are absolutely 
necessary. Incorporating the tribes and tribal elders into the process 
will ensure a much smoother transition. Each area of the FAT A is 
different, with different needs and traditions. Success is dependent 
upon these needs being met and these traditions being accounted for. 
Another necessary method of local involvement is incorporating women 
into these reforms. 
humanitarian aid workers. In short, the Taliban leadership clearly has the ability to respect 
IHL and should be held to account for a failure to do so. Id. at 30. 
186. Id. at 39. 
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A. Previous Attempts at Reforming FATA Governing Mechanisms 
While Pakistan's executive leadership has made some halfhearted 
attempts over the last two decades to remedy the extreme inequality the 
FCR legalizes, these minimal steps have been fruitless because they 
have lacked the requisite legislative support. In 1996, Pakistan finally 
extended voting rights to adults in the FAT A and also proposed several 
reforms to the FCR but they never got very far. Then in 2005, 
Musharraf acknowledged the need for reforms and the NWFP (as Kyber 
Pakhtunkhwa was then called) governor created the FCR Reform 
Committee, but the committee did not accomplish much at all. 187 In 
2008, the Pakistani Peoples Party (PPP) promised to repeal the FCR and 
incorporate the FAT A into Pakistan's constitutional framework. Also 
in 2008, Prime Minister Gilani announced the FCR had been revoked, 
but there has been no legislation or judicial ruling to substantiate that 
claim or to put it into practical effect. 
In August 2009, former President Asif Ali Zardari announced a 
reform package for the FAT A, which included placing limitations on 
the powers of the PA, right to bail for detainees, protection for women 
and children from the collective responsibility provisions, access for 
political parties and the setting up of an appeals process. While these 
reforms would have limited some of the scope of the FCR, the FCR is 
still in place. In 2010, Zardari again promised to reform the FCR but 
there has been little movement to actually do so. 188 
B. The FATA Must be Integrated into the Central Government 
Though Pakistan has made some attempts to reform the way it 
governs the FAT A it needs to take a more radical step and totally repeal 
the AA CPR and the FCR in order to manage the FAT A in accordance 
with international human rights standards. The FAT A must be brought 
under constitutional protection so that the people living within it have 
their fundamental rights enforced just like the rest of Pakistan's 
citizenry. Under the ICCPR every citizen is supposed to have the right 
and opportunity to take part in public affairs directly or through chosen 
187. Govt Failed to Implement Recent Reforms in FATA, Amendments in FCR After 
Passage of Six Months, ONE PAKJSTAN, available at http://pakistan.onepakistan.com.pk 
/news/ city/islamabad/6884 7 -govt-failed-to-imp lement-recent-reforms-in-fata-amendments-
in-fcr-after-passage-of-six-months.html (last visited May 10, 2015). 
188. Raja Asghar, Zardari Eyeing History, Wants Bill Passed Soon, DAWN (Apr. 6, 
2010), available at http://www.dawn.com/news/529098/zardari-eyeing-history-wants-bill-
passed-soon (last visited May 10, 2015). 
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representatives. 189 Citizens should also be able to vote in periodic 
elections through equal suffrage in a way guarantees "the free 
expression of the will of the electors." 19° For the most part, Pakistan 
abides by these internationally accepted rights, except for when dealing 
with the FAT A. Except for the FAT A, all the other provinces in 
Pakistan are represented through elected legislators in the bicameral 
parliament191 and the Prime Minister appoints a Chief Minister, as his 
representative, to oversee the provincial governments. Though the 
FAT A elects representatives to Parliament, no act of Parliament applies 
unless the President so directs. 192 As a result, the Political Agent, an 
executive that answers only to the President, is the only true official 
governing the FAT A. 
The FAT A must be integrated into the central government as much 
as any other province of Pakistan. This means treating it in equality 
with other provinces, providing it with representation in Parliament and 
with a Chief Minister. It means establishing free and fair elections and 
enfranchising the entire adult population of the FAT A. The role of the 
PA should be abolished and the constitution should be amended through 
removal of Article 24 7 so that jurisdiction and control of the judicial 
system and parliament extend there. Doing so will make the central 
government and the entire electorate accountable for the issues in the 
region. 
Until the Political Parties Act of 2002 193 was extended in 2011, 
political parties were banned in the FAT A. Lack of political parties 
made it difficult to have participatory political culture because without 
the financial backing of such organizations people could not afford to 
contest and win elections. 194 And even if they managed to win an 
election without the backing of a political party, that elected individual 
would remain insignificant in the parliamentary politics in Islamabad 
without the backing of any particular faction and because acts of 
parliament have no effect in the FAT A. 195 This is not an effective way 
189. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 25(a). 
190. Id. art. 25(b ). 
191. Pakistan's Parliament is made up of the lower house, known as the National 
Assembly, and the upper house, known as the Senate. The National Assembly is comprised 
of directly elected representatives from the four provinces. The Senate is comprised of 
indirectly elected representatives. 
192. PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 54, 59, 247(3). 
193. Pakistan Chief Exec. Order 18 (2002), available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/ 
47567a432.pdf (last visited May 10, 2015). 
194. Impoverished Northwest, supra note 11. 
195. Id. 
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to build up the region. Regardless of whom they elect, even if they have 
a free and fair choice in the matter, that representative will be further 
proof of the incompetency of the federal government's reach. What 
would be the point of investing in an election when you know your vote 
is meaningless. 
Though the Political Parties Act has limited the PA's authority to 
some extent, until 2011 the PA enjoyed absolute control over matters of 
law and administration. The people of the FAT A had no say in local or 
national decision making because the PA was not, and still is not, under 
any obligation to take them into account. So although the FAT A can 
technically elect representatives to the National Assembly, voter turnout 
in the FATA is low. This is likely because despite the extension of the 
Political Parties Act and the limitation of the PA's power, people know 
the elections lack any real legitimacy and that there is no effective 
representation at the national level. The FCR's allocation of power to 
the Political Agent leaves the political power of the FAT A electorate 
negligible at best. And since the FCR doesn't allow judicial decisions 
or parliamentary legislation to extend to the FAT A, these governmental 
bodies can go on just ignoring the crises that exists there. 
Fully integrating the FAT A means not only repealing 
counterproductive legislation like the FCR and AACPR, but also 
creating better mechanisms of governing. Knowing that voter turnout is 
low because voting has very little tangible effect in the FAT A means 
Pakistan needs to get rid of those apparatuses that prevent the FAT A 
from moving forward. That means establishing a new system of 
governmg. 
The PA continues to be a repressive force, unaccountable to 
anyone but the President. Replacing the PA with a Chief Minister, an 
appointee of an elected representative with far more limited power, 
would foster better results. Every province in Pakistan has a provincial 
assembly, analogous to state legislatures in the U.S., which deals with 
provincial matters. 196 Every province except the FAT A. The Taliban 
corrupted the FAT A's Jirga system, but it was hardly a fair system of 
governing to begin with. Instead of allowing the tribal lands to continue 
with the Jirgas, the government should establish a provincial assembly 
in the FAT A as well. A more direct line of governing is likely to build 
faith among the tribal lands because they are more likely to see the 
results that they need, rather than waiting for the federal government to 
step in as they have been. 
196. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 106. 
36
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 2 [2015], Art. 6
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss2/6
2015] Road to Recovery 481 
C. Women Must be Treated Equally with Men Before the Law 
Another change that should be made in FAT A governing is better 
treatment of women. While the rest of the constitution enfranchises 
women by mandating seats for them in Parliament, it conspicuously 
fails to do so for women in the FAT A by not allocating seats for 
them. 197 Women in the FATA also do not have the right to vote. This 
right should be extended in the FAT A since it already exists throughout 
the other provinces. The ICCPR talks about universal suffrage 198 and 
CEDAW specifies that women should be afforded equality with men 
before the law. 199 
Another way to better the situation of women in the FAT A would 
be to involve them in all reconstruction efforts going forth. It is 
imperative that a more inclusive public sphere be created for women. 
That means women must be guaranteed fair and equal voting rights as 
well as the ability to participate in conflict resolution and 
reconstruction. Pakistan must find a way to enfranchise women in a 
way that does not force them to break with their tribal traditions. They 
will have a voice in the reconstruction of their communities without 
being forced to value their traditions against a new governmental order. 
The current state of women in the FAT A violates the terms of the 
ICCPR and CEDA W and is also contradictory to the majority of the 
constitution. Pakistan must remedy this in order to comply with its 
international obligations and also to maintain consistency in governing. 
D. Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations Must be Held Accountable 
Pakistan needs to send a clear message that the violence and 
inhumane treatment the FAT A has dealt with is completely 
unacceptable. It needs to earn the confidence of the tribal people and 
eventually their support. That means not only extending rights and 
protections to the tribal lands but also holding both state and non-state 
actors accountable for their human rights transgressions. So far 
Pakistan has failed in its responsibility to protect the people of the 
FAT A from Taliban insurgents, as well as misconduct by the armed 
forces. 
At the hands of the Taliban the FAT A has been riddled with 
unlawful killing, unlawful detention, torture, ill treatment, deprivation 
of equality, inadequate healthcare, no freedom of association, no 
197. Id. arts. 54, 59. 
198. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 25(b). 
199. CEDAW, supra note 157, art. 15. 
37
Tameez: Road to Recovery: Pakistan's Human Rights Crises in the FATA
Published by SURFACE, 2015
482 Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com. [Vol. 42:2 
freedom of movement and dwindling education for girls and women. 200 
They have suffered the destruction of civilian residences, farms and 
businesses.201 All of these serious human rights violations are already 
considered criminal offenses under Pakistan's law, but such law has 
never been enforced due to neglect and the cover given to the central 
government under the FCR. 
While the central government and even the military are not 
completely responsible202 for the actions of the Taliban, they are 
responsible for failing to exact adequate measures to stop these abuses 
from happening once they are aware. This can only be done through the 
extension of judicial jurisdiction. Since the Pakistan's courts have no 
reach in the FAT A, any allegations of mistreatment cannot be brought 
before an impartial body and therefore injured parties have no form of 
redress and perpetrators are not held accountable. The FAT A does have 
its own court system, but the Jirgas or the will of the Political Agent 
often circumvents those courts' decisions. To reform this, the FATA 
courts should be brought under the national judicial system just as the 
other provincial courts are, with their apex being the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan. 
When Pakistan eventually deals with the Taliban, as it will 
inevitably have to do, it must refrain from giving clemency to those who 
are unequivocally implicated in those serious abuses of human rights 
and breaches of law. According to customary international 
humanitarian law, military commanders and civilian leaders can be held 
accountable for the actions of their subordinates, when and if their 
subordinates commit war crimes, or if they knew their subordinates 
were committing such actions, and they took no necessary measures to 
prevent such actions. 203 Taliban leaders can be held accountable for the 
abuses they perpetrate and, under this same provision, so can armed 
forces personnel. 
Remedying the Taliban's transgressions will be only one part of 
Pakistan's efforts towards solving the human rights crisis in the FATA. 
Pakistan must also hold its own military and political leaders 
200. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 100. 
201. Id. 
202. There are peace talks with the Taliban where the military or state agencies have 
condoned, allowed, or supported some of the Taliban's actions against FATA residents. In 
those instances, Pakistan is certainly more responsible, and should eventually be held 
accountable through investigation and judicial action. Strategic considerations should not 
be available as an excuse for neglecting the population or for knowingly allowing insurgents 
to commit human rights transgressions. 
203. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 173, at Rule 152. 
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accountable. First, Pakistan must make sure that all military forces are 
aware of the correct standard of conduct that is expected of them under 
international law and under the hopefully reformed method of 
governing the FAT A. They must then be required to comply with those 
obligations and it must be made clear that failure to do so will have 
appropriate consequences. Human rights transgressions that have 
already been made should be properly and impartially investigated 
according to international standards so that those who have committed 
illegal actions are brought to justice. The military should be required to 
incorporate precautionary measures for civilians in their strategy, and 
they should absolutely be prohibited from any sort of collective 
punishment, the sort that is allowed under the current FCR. 
Some of Pakistan's most egregious human rights violations revolve 
around arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances. 204 Not only is 
this a human rights violation, but it also creates a climate of fear in the 
FAT A that is counterproductive to any reconstructive efforts. Pakistan 
should investigate and reveal any information it has about the fate and 
location of those who have been subjected to enforced disappearances. 
Pakistan should also sign and ratify the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance ("CED"). 
Ratification of CED would signal that Pakistan is committed to ending 
this practice, which is a grave violation of human rights. 
Those criminal and insurgent suspects who can be transferred out 
of military custody and into civilian detention centers should be 
transferred and then should be provided with all the safeguards 
available to them under the constitution, 205 domestic and international 
law. Those detainees should then be afforded fair trials in front of 
competent and impartial courts. Pakistan may have an easier time of all 
this if it builds up the law enforcement mechanism of the tribal areas. 
Rather than having a constant military presence, a trained law 
enforcement agency would be able to alleviate the military presence in 
the region while still being a safeguard against insurgents and protecting 
civilians. 
CONCLUSION 
The problems Pakistan faces are certainly not simple ones. Any 
remedy that Pakistan implements, and there are many that it must, will 
204. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 49. 
205. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 10. 
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take years to show practical improvement. But the longer Pakistan 
waits, the worse the situation in the FAT A gets. More people will lose 
their lives, their homes and their livelihoods. Pakistan can start by 
taking legislative measures to equalize the FAT A and its residents with 
the rest of the country. Pakistan must then begin holding those who 
have committed human rights abuses accountable for their actions and 
showing the FAT A residents that they are not in fact second-class 
citizens. Pakistan must then begin to rebuild the FAT A through greater 
infrastructure; better education, especially for women and girls; access 
to health care and training for law enforcement to maintain security. 
Pakistan has to create incentives for the FAT A to support it because as 
of right now they risk losing their lives by expressing dissent from the 
Taliban and any sort of government effort towards redress does not 
outweigh this risk. 
Pakistan has made many mistakes in dealing with the FAT A. 
Between decades of neglect for the tribal lands and the military' s 
gutting of the region for "national security" purposes, the inadequate 
judicial systems, the weak government structure and the total lack of 
development, the situation has only worsened. These issues have to be 
remedied not only because they are major transgressions against human 
rights, but also because they exacerbate a problem that poses a 
substantial threat to Pakistan's national security and internal stability. It 
is time for Pakistan to meet its human rights responsibilities to its 
people, both for morality and for practical necessity. 
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